Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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"Everything he said is true": logical problem of self-reference within a domain. See also completeness, truth, paradoxes.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Item Summary Meta data
Horwich I 214
Everything he said/Strawson/Cohen: E.g. - what the policeman said is true - here "true" is not needed to make a statement - with that the paradoxes disappear - solution: mere presupposition that a statement was made - if we would make no statements with that, paradoxes would ever disappear - CohenVsStrawson: a judge could take this as evidence of the character of the policemen - but it is not.(1)

1. 1. Peter F. Strawson, "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950, in: Paul Horwich (ed.) Theories of Truth, Aldershot 1994
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Horwich I 216
Everything he said/Cohen: E.g. - for all p. if the police officer claims that p, then p - "here paradoxes may again arise" - analog to the truth paradox - paradox/logical form/Cohen: can occur when in (p):(x).f(p.x)>. ~ p. this expression can occur as a whole as the value of p.(2)

2. Laurence Jonathan Cohen, "Mr. Strawson’s Analysis of Truth", Analysis 10 (1950) pp. 136-140,
in: Paul Horwich (ed.) Theories of Truth, Aldershot 1994


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Strawson I
Peter F. Strawson
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959
German Edition:
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Strawson II
Peter F. Strawson
"Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit",
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk, Frankfurt/M. 1977

Strawson III
Peter F. Strawson
"On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976

Strawson IV
Peter F. Strawson
Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992
German Edition:
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Strawson V
P.F. Strawson
The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966
German Edition:
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Strawson VI
Peter F Strawson
Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf, Frankfurt/M. 1993

Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2019-07-19
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