Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| "Everything he said is true": This is about a logical problem of self-reference within a domain. See also completeness, truth, paradoxes._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Peter F. Strawson on Everything he said is true - Dictionary of Arguments
Horwich I 214 Everything he said/Strawson/Cohen: E.g. - what the policeman said is true. - Here "true" is not needed to make a statement. - With that the paradoxes disappear. Solution: mere presupposition that a statement was made. If we would make no statements with that, paradoxes would ever disappear. CohenVsStrawson: a judge could take this as evidence of the character of the policemen - but it is not.(1) 1. 1. Peter F. Strawson, "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950, in: Paul Horwich (ed.) Theories of Truth, Aldershot 1994 --- Horwich I 216 Everything he said/Cohen: E.g. - for all p. if the police officer claims that p, then p.- Here paradoxes may again arise, analog to the truth paradox. >Paradoxes. Paradox/logical form/Cohen: paradoxes can occur when in (p):(x).f(p.x)>. ~ p. This expression can occur as a whole as the value of p.(2) 2. Laurence Jonathan Cohen, "Mr. Strawson’s Analysis of Truth", Analysis 10 (1950) pp. 136-140, in: Paul Horwich (ed.) Theories of Truth, Aldershot 1994_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk, Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf, Frankfurt/M. 1993 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
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