|"Everything he said is true": This is about a logical problem of self-reference within a domain. See also completeness, truth, paradoxes._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Grover, D. L. on Everything he said is true - Dictionary of Arguments
Horwich I 336
Everything he said is true/Prosentential theory/CGB/Camp/Grover/Belnap: everything John says is true - for each proposition, when John says that it is true, then it is true - that can not be understood as - when John said that Snow is white, is true, then it is true that snow is white.
Because there is "it" from (4) understood as the anaphora (pronoun)
(4) For every proposition, if John said that it is true, it is true
rather the instances phrases like e.g. If John said that snow is white, then it is true that snow is white. - Here is "it is true" taken as the anaphora (and that is a pro-sentence). See >Prosentential Theory, >Anaphora._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
|Grover, D. L.
Gro I D. Grover, A Prosentential Theory of Thruth, Princeton New Jersey 1992
D. L. Grover, J L. Camp, N. D. Belnap
Philosophical Studies 27 (1) 73 – 125 (1975)
See external reference in the individual contributions.
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994