Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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Actualism: in relation to worlds the thesis that only our own world is real. - Counter-position essentialism.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Item Summary Meta data
I 12/1
Actualism / Stalnaker: does not take possible worlds literally as worlds - but as ways of how the world might have been - punch line: contingent identity is not allowed, but probably contingent dissimilarity.
I 120
Actualism / Stalnaker: is no restrictive metaphysical theory as materialism or nominalism - it is just a trivial consequence of the meaning of "actual".
I 128
Presentism / Stalnaker: analogous to actualism regarding worlds: thesis, we are extended in time just as we are spread over possible worlds - then we can have real temporal identity. (Stalnaker per) - fusion / fission / personal identity: are then cases where persons who were separated earlier become identical or a person is divided into two.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Stalnaker I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2019-07-23
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