Dictionary of Arguments

Screenshot Tabelle Begriffe

 
Actualism: in relation to worlds the thesis that only our own world is real. - Counter-position essentialism.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Item Summary Meta data
III 8/9
Actualism/Armstrong per: not assuming possible things under any circumstances - but past + future are real and do exist - truthmaker must be actual.
III 125
Anti-Actualism/Armstrong: (E.g. uninstantiated idiosyncratic reaction between particles with high probability) - someone might say, "there might also have been a different reaction" the SaD applies - Armstrong: someone like this assumes non-actual physically possible states that also involve ED - because they are part of the ontology, they are defined - ArmstrongVs: extreme non-actualism - solution: instead: non-factualism: there are no facts here - that is why the SaD fails here.
III 135
Actualism/Probability/Armstrong: rejects irreducible potentialities (possibilia) - (Armstrong ditto) - Question: Is probability not merely an unrealized possibility? - ArmstrongVs: it is a fact which other categorical properties the object has.


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
Reply to Martin
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2018-12-14
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