|Similarity: conformity of one or more - but not all - properties of two or more objects.|
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Perception/Similarity/Quine: transition from perception to perception similarity (perc.sim.) makes perception itself disappear - ontological clarity - similarity: three digit: Episode a resembles b more than c - perception similarity: in contrast, bundle of dispositions of 2nd order (to respond).
Similarity/Quine: bundle of behavioral dispositions of 2nd order - relative: e.g. red ball, yellow rose - red rose, red scarf: depends on reward whether ball and rose are similar - perception similarity: if four-digit relation, then "viewpoint" superfluous - learning: here, there must be different degrees of similarity! - Otherwise any enhanced relation would equally be conditioned on every future episode, because they would all be equally similar - from that follows that perception similarity standards are innate.
Classes: do not explain similarity: an object does not have any more class memberships in common with another one than with any third one.
Similarity/Quine: Episodes: three types of similarity: 1) reception similarity: has to do only with input variables - 2) behavioral similarity: ultimately definable by total quantity of fibers. - 3) perception similarity: somehow in the middle between 1st and 2nd inner state: may be determined by previous stimuli, but not by the present ones! - Reason: perceptual similarity standards are subject to change (through more reward).
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Meaning/Quine: problems: a) "having a meaning", b) equality of meaning: we can explore the latter via behavior, without having to adopt meaning as an entity.
Definition "less than"/Quine: y.
Similarity/Logic/Set Theory/Classes/Quine/Lauener: similarity has a dubious logic status: sets do not help in explaining:
Things can be freely combined to sets - any two things are common elements of the same number of classes as any other two things - therefore it is not possible to reflect "a is more similar to b than to c" by "a and b together belong to more sets than a and c".
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953
Bezeichnung und Referenz
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003