Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Similarity: Similarity is the conformity of one or more - but not all - properties of two or more objects. See also Identity, Equality, Properties, Predicates, Predication, Identification, Descriptions._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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W.V.O. Quine on Similarity - Dictionary of Arguments
V 33 Perception/Similarity/Quine: transition from perception to perception similarity (perc.sim.) makes perception itself disappear - ontological clarity. Similarity: three digit: Episode a resembles b more than c - perception similarity: in contrast, bundle of dispositions of 2nd order (to respond). >Perception, >Dispositions, >Ontology. V 35 Similarity/Quine: bundle of behavioral dispositions of 2nd order - relative: e.g. red ball, yellow rose - red rose, red scarf: depends on reward whether ball and rose are similar - perception similarity: if four-digit relation, then "viewpoint" superfluous - learning: here, there must be different degrees of similarity! - Otherwise any enhanced relation would equally be conditioned on every future episode, because they would all be equally similar - from that follows that perception similarity standards are innate. V 37 Classes: do not explain similarity: an object does not have any more class memberships in common with another one than with any third one. V 39 Similarity/Quine: Episodes: three types of similarity: 1) reception similarity: has to do only with input variables 2) behavioral similarity: ultimately definable by total quantity of fibers. 3) perception similarity: somehow in the middle between 1st and 2nd inner state: may be determined by previous stimuli, but not by the present ones! - Reason: perceptual similarity standards are subject to change (through more reward). - - - VII (a) 12ff Meaning/Quine: problems: a) "having a meaning", b) equality of meaning: we can explore the latter via behavior, without having to adopt meaning as an entity. >Meaning. --- Lauener XI 108f Similarity/Logic/Set Theory/Classes/Quine/Lauener: similarity has a dubious logic status: sets do not help in explaining: Lauener XI 109 Things can be freely combined to sets - any two things are common elements of the same number of classes as any other two things - therefore it is not possible to reflect "a is more similar to b than to c" by "a and b together belong to more sets than a and c"._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Q XI H. Lauener Willard Van Orman Quine München 1982 |
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> Counter arguments against Quine
> Counter arguments in relation to Similarity
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-19