|Similarity: conformity of one or more - but not all - properties of two or more objects.|
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|Rorty I 255
Similarity/Rorty: sufficient: the expectation system should be abstract and complicated in the same sense. Because the recognized identities are surprisingly independent from the physical uniformities of the stimuli among one another.
Fodor IV 18f
Sameness/Similarity/Everyday language studies/Intentionality/Fodor/Lepore: Problem: in order to state similarity, identity must already have been defined - Problem: believing almost the same: requires countability and identity of beliefs - E.g. when someone asks you a color, you would answer something like "red" - problem: no idea what the truth conditions would be for these generalizations! - Therefore, we cannot do without identity in favor of equality Solution: yet-to-be-found stricter concept of similarity (with respect to beliefs or semantic entities) - ((s)> VsAnalyticity) - "holism: if he s right, the concept "token of the same type" is defined only if all beliefs are shared - Problem: -almost of the same type.
Similarity/Functional role/Causal/Association/Hume/Fodor/Lepore: analog: what a mental picture reminds you of does not depend on what role it plays in mental processes - Hume: but the causal role depends on what the image is associated with - and an idea (imagination) can easily be associated with anything that is consistent with its content - Conclusion: the truth conditions are independent of the causal role - Hume is not a functionalist in terms of content - Fodor/Lepore: no one believes today, that the content of a representation depends on what it reminds of - the only exception: connectionism.
J. Fodor/E. Lepore
Holism Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000