Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Abstraction: Subsumption of objects by non-consideration of certain properties. See also equivalence relation, concretion, concreta, indiscernibility._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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D.M. Armstrong on Abstraction - Dictionary of Arguments
III 84 Abstraction/Armstrong: always from states: individuals considered "particulars" are a mere abstraction, as well as a property or a relation without particulars; there is no "naked" particular or relation. - Particularity and universality are real abstractions and therefore real in the states. - E.g. A particular: abstraction from all states where it occurs, example of a propertiy: from all situations where the particular has the property F: F-ness._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
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> Counter arguments against Armstrong
> Counter arguments in relation to Abstraction
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-16