Dictionary of Arguments

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Abstract: non-representational - abstract concept, expression of something non-objective - how to demarcate from concrete objects? How to differentiate between abstract entities and concepts, ultimately words.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Item Summary Meta data
I 102
Abstract/Concrete: independent from stimulus meaning.
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I 212 ff
Abstract terms: alleged names of properties - "roundness": "F"/"round":"a" in "Fa" - should not be used unhesitatingly without metaphysical definition - would be too non-binding - every abstract singular term provides an abstract general term.
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I 219
Not all abstract objects are properties: numbers, classes, functions, geometrical figures, ideas, possibilities - giving up or re-tracing abstract objects - faithfully distinguish them from concrete ones by use of "-ness".
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I 238
Plural: abstract singular term: "lions are dying out" -Disposition: "eats mice" (31).
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I 286
Intensional abstraction: "the act of being a dog", "the act of baking a cake", "the act of erring".
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I 289
Class abstraction attributed to singular descriptions: (iy)(x)(x from y iff ..x..) - instead of: x^(..x..) - is not possible for intensional abstraction.
Difference classes/Properties: classes identical, with the same elements - properties not quite identical if they are attributed to the same things.
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I 361f
Abstraction of relations, propositions and properties: opaque (planets).
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I 295
Class abstraction: transparent, - intensional abstraction: opaque.
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V 167
Abstract general term: relative clause: "Y is a class X such that FX" - new: these are classes of classes. Normal relative clause: = general term: "y is a thing x such that Fx".
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VII (d) 75
Concrete/abstract/Quine: by pointing to a square we do not assume identity with others - "squareness" is shared by other objects, but we do not need to insinuate entities like "attributes". - We do not point to the "attributes" (as an entity) nor do we need it in reference to the word "square".
VII (d) 77
Abstract singular term/Quine: like names - philosophically revolutionary: setting abstract entities - (unlike general term).
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VII (f) 113
Abstract entities/Quine: classes and truth values may be accepted abstract entities - only statements and predicates should not be regarded as names of these and other entities, i.e. "p", "q"p,"F" etc. should not be bindable (quantifiable) variables (>2nd order logic) - (E.g.)(x is a dog. x is white.) does not commit X to "dogness" or to the class of white things as universals. - Solution: explicit form: belonging to two classes: (Ex)(xεy.xεz). - Of course, there are names for abstract entities: singular term: "dogness" "class of white things" (as names ((s) it does not imply existence).


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2018-12-16
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