|Abstract: non-representational - abstract concept, expression of something non-objective - how to demarcate from concrete objects? How to differentiate between abstract entities and concepts, ultimately words._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
|I 497 f
Abstraction/Explanation/Dennett: Dan Sperber: you must not proceed too abstract intentionally. Abstract objects do not enter directly into the causal relationships.
E.g. the excitement of a child is not caused by the abstract story of Little Peter's Journey to the Moon, but by the fact that he understands his mother's words.
Dennett: this is no obstacle for science, on the contrary: it can cut the Gordian knot of tangled causal relationships by using an abstract formulation and ignoring all those complications. (>Intentional stance).
E.g. the excitement of the child does not result from the abstract story, but from the understanding of the words of its mother._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997
Kinds of Minds, New York 1996
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999
"COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots"
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger, Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996
"Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005