Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Intention: the will to commit an act, as opposed to a random occurrence of such an event. See also motives, causation, will._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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P.F. Strawson on Intentions - Dictionary of Arguments
Meggle I 24ff Intention/StrawsonVsGrice: may be hided complicatly by courtesy, nevertheless can hint at something etc. - modification: the n-th part-intention of S is that H should recognize that S has the (n-1)th part-intention. Meggle I 30 Re-definition: 1. H shows R (reaction) 2. H believes that S (1) intends 3. Hs fulfillment of (1) is based on Hs' fulfilment of (2). Meggle I 31 SearleVsGrice: (>Lemons Example: The soldier did not mean that he himself is a spy. (intention/meaning/meaning independent). Supplement: H should recognize that the uttered sentence is uttered conventionally to achieve a certain effect. >Convention. Meggle I 33 Grice E.g.: An Arab trader invites a tourist who doesn't speak Arab to enter his shop: "You damned ...": one can say that the trader thinks the customer should come in, but the sentence does not mean it. Lemon example: not the sentence but the situation is decisive. >Situation, >Speaker meaning, >Speaker intention, >Intentions._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk, Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf, Frankfurt/M. 1993 Grice: > Meg I G. Meggle (Hg) Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung Frankfurt/M 1979 |
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> Counter arguments against Strawson
> Counter arguments in relation to Intentions
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-24