|Intention: the will to commit an act, as opposed to a random occurrence of such an event. See also motives, causation, will._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.|
Books on Amazon
Gricean Intention/names/Reference/Putnam: (continuation of the example, see there) names are inserted in the primitive language by Gricean intention:
1. The speaker will induce the belief that he refers2(sic) to the description, under which the name was originally introduced.
2. The fact that this description could be replaced by any other that fulfills what has been described in terms of the original introduction in a hypothetical situation. - N.B.: this is a chain of transfers involving the use of reference2(sic) and thus does not require reference3. - Therefore the use of intentions - to refer - is not circular in the formulation of the causal theory of reference.
Question: have the rising terms of reference only family resemblance?
N.B. of all examples: sentences are only accepted in the long term if they are true._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990