|Intention: the will to commit an act, as opposed to a random occurrence of such an event. See also motives, causation, will._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Intention/opinion/Habermas; one can have knowledge of intentions as well as of occurrences in the world; opinions are different: Opinions are not intentions. The listener may know that the speaker has an opinion, but what he means he can only know if he understands what is meant (the meaning of a symbolic expression). (1)
1.A Leist, Über einige Irrtümer der intentionalen Semantik, 1978; K. O. Apel, Intentions, Conventions and Reference of Things, in: H. Parret (Ed) Meaning and Understanding, Berlin 1981._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981