|Intention: the will to commit an act, as opposed to a random occurrence of such an event. See also motives, causation, will._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
|Avr I 17
BennettVsGrice: instead of intentions (too complicated): simply "Plain Talk": speaker relies on thefaith of the listener whenever an utterance U is expressed a particular proposition p is true - GriceVsVs: instead: "background-fact" - eliminates troublesome propositional attitudes - Avramides: pro intentions - and why should they be easy?_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
"The Meaning-Nominalist Strategy" in: Foundations of Language, 10, 1973, pp. 141-168
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1979