|Picture, mapping: what conditions must meet a picture? In how it relates to the depicted object? Is there a copy ratio in nature? See also similarity, causation, representation, causality.|
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To say of a particular atomic fact it would be represented by a certain elementary statement, we must use a statement in which the elementary statement occurs, but not truth-functional. We have to say something like:
(1)S(in L)maps aRb. This mapping relationship cannot be expressed by a statement. Wittgenstein ditto.
But not A and B are mapped, but a fact about a and b. Therefore, (1) has the form:
(1""")S(in L) maps the fact that aRb.
This now presupposes that the fact aRb in a sense, is an object. But then it is an object of a special kind, because: object: is named and not uttered - fact: is uttered and not named. (Although the name of a statement can be made).
... Thus, the problem of truth is only postponed. Because if facts belong to language (language/world) then "mapping" is a relation between statement and statement (Linguistic Idealism). Then the world must belong to language that would be absurd.
Solution: S(in L) means aRb and that aRb is a fact
then we can apply our conception of "Picture" to the distinction that we have obtained from the semantic theory. (Tarski, disquotation). It is well known that Wittgenstein restricted his picture theory to fact statements in the narrower sense.
Thesis: that elementary statements are configurations of proper names that map configurations of objects. This means that statements are not lists of words.
If concluding is an activity, then mapping is no relation.(II 312> Description). And there are those uniformities, by virtue of which picture is an actual relation between objects in nature.
Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999