|Brocker I 138
Democratic theory/Kelsen: it is not to be expected that Kelsen would value a certain model of democracy, because that would contradict the political neutrality of his legal positivism. Kelsen's assessment, however, goes beyond his theoretical views. (cf. Dreier 1990)(1) Kelsen's theory of democracy cannot be derived from his theory of law. Not the model of democracy favored by Kelsen, but his theory of democracy shows parallels to his legal-theoretical argumentation.
Kelsen does not justify his reflections on democracy, its preconditions and necessary elements normatively, but argues with reference to the functioning of institutions.
He does not consider the minorities worthy of protection for normative reasons, but because they are a practical component of majority rule. He does not consider the relativistic ideology to be a priority for reasons of tolerance or rejection of fundamentalist positions, but because democratic procedures cannot function otherwise.
Kelsen tries to separate analytical and evaluative components of scientific argumentation and accuses critics of concealing metaphysical positions. Kelsen rejects all such argumentations as "natural justice". >Natural Justice/Kelsen.
1. Horst Dreier , Rechtslehre, Staatssoziologie und Demokratietheorie bei Hans Kelsen, Baden-Baden 1990 S. 249-294.
Marcus Llanque, „Hans Kelsen, Vom Wesen und Wert der Demokratie“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018