Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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Author Item Summary Meta data
Brocker I 858
Justice/PettitVsRawls/Pettit: Pettit has stylized himself as a republican opponent of Rawl's theory of justice. He wants to oppose Rawl's model (see Justice/Rawls) with its own model, which "in a more substantial way" elaborates the ideas of freedom and social justice. (1)(2)
Rawls/(s): is based on principles instead of "contents".
Brocker i 859
RichterVsRawls: Pettit's model appears weak precisely where the concrete allocation of functions to public participation for the purpose of defining and controlling options for action by the state is concerned. Moreover, ironically, Rawls and Pettit's models resemble each other at precisely those points where Pettit claims to present the alternative to liberal political theory.
It is Rawl's principle of difference that makes it possible to solve the problems raised by Pettit. (3) See Difference Principle/Rawls.



1. Philip Pettit, »Depoliticizing Democracy«, in: Ratio Juris 17/1, 2004
2. Philip Pettit, Beyond Rawls, 2012, 107ff
3. John Rawls, Eine Theorie der Gerechtigkeit, 1975, S. 96


Emanuel Richter, „Philip Pettit, Republicanism“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Pett I
Ph. Pettit
Just Freedom: A Moral Compass for a Complex World New York 2014

Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2019-08-20
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