Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Pluralism: Pluralism is the view that society is composed of a variety of competing groups and interests, and that no single group or ideology should have dominant influence. Pluralists believe that diversity is a strength, and that it leads to better decision-making and social outcomes. See also Society, Community._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Isaiah Berlin on Pluralism - Dictionary of Arguments
Gaus I 241 Pluralism/Berlin/D’Agostino: We might believe, (...) as Isaiah Berlin influentially claimed, that diversity in valuations is a reflection, empirically, of a deep and objective fact about values per se, and not about the limitations, however profound, of human reasoning about them. Cf. >Pluralism/D’Agostino, >Diversity/D’Agostino. We might hold, as John Gray put it, that such values are many, (that) they often come into conflict with one another and are uncombinable in a single human being or a single society, and that in many of such conflicts there is no overarching standard whereby the competing claims of such ultimate values are rationally arbitratable. (1993(1): 65) D’Agostino: Here, monism is rejected not on 'practical' grounds, as in Rawls's weak version of pluralism, but rather on the basis, precisely, of 'disputed philosophical theses' (...). BerlinVsMonism: In particular, monism is rejected on ontological grounds - values are plural - and on ethical grounds - the elimination of apparent diversity can slight values that ought to be honoured (and not merely, as in Rawls's 'weak pluralism', because the elimination of diversity would itself require impermissible forms of behaviour). Diversity/Berlin: As Berlin said, it is better to face (the) intellectually uncomfortable fact tof 'objective' diversity) than to ignore it, or automatically attribute it to some deficiency on our part which could be eliminated by an increase in skill or knowledge; or, what is worse still, suppress one of the competing values altogether by pretending it is identical with its rival - and so end by distorting both. (1969(2): l) D’Agostino: Such a strong pluralism is no longer merely 'practical' , though Rawls's own analysis alludes to some the argumentation supportmg such a stance. >Pluralism/Rawls, >Pluralism/Political Philosophy, >Pluralism’D’Agostino. 1. Gray, John (1993) Post-Liberalism. New York: Routledge. 2. Berlin, Isaiah (1969) Four Essays on Liberty. London: Oxford University Press. D’Agostino, Fred 2004. „Pluralism and Liberalism“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Berl I Isaiah Berlin Four Essays on Liberty Oxford 1990 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-19