|Mause I 412f
State/New Political Economy/Public Choice: If one follows the New Political Economy (Frey and Kirchgässner 2002 (1); Mueller 2003 (2); in relation to environmental policy Kollmann and Schneider 2010 (3)), the state is not a superordinate political instance designed solely for the pursuit of public interest. Rather, it is assumed that the state is/stays caught in a "undergrowth of conflicts of interest". (4)
In principle, selfish behaviour on the part of politicians is assumed, with the respective (short-term) chances of re-election representing a central restriction to action. At the same time, myopic voters are assumed, i.e. they are only incompletely informed about political measures and are primarily oriented towards the short-term effects that are immediately apparent to them. See Environmental Policy/Public Choice.
1. Frey, Bruno S., und Gebhard Kirchgässner. 2002. Demokratische Wirtschaftspolitik, 3. Aufl. München 2002.
2. Mueller, Dennis C.,Public choice III: A revised edition of public choice. Cambridge 2003
3. Kollmann, Andrea, und Friedrich Schneider. 2010. Why does environmental policy in representative democracies tend to be inadequate? A preliminary public choice analysis. CESifo working paper series, Bd. 3223. München: CESifo.
4. Alfred Endress, Umweltökonomie, Stuttgart 2000._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
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