|Brocker I 477
Social goods/collective goods/Olson: generally, goods are differentiated in the economic literature as follows:
Private Goods/Musgrave: are characterised by exclusivity (not everyone has access) and rivalry (consumption reduces the amount of goods)
Club goods: Excludability - Rivalry
Common goods: non-excludability - Rivalry (e.g. fishing)
Public goods: Non-excludability - Non-Rivalry. (1)
On the other hand Olson: distinguishes between exclusive and including goods.
Def Exclusive Collective Goods: are primarily found in market-oriented groups. They are characterised by rivalry. (2) Here the total benefit of the collective good does not increase with the number of users. Thus it corresponds to the common good. The benefit for the individual decreases with the number of users.
Def including collective goods/Olson: are characterized by non-rivalry. The benefits for all increase with an increasing number of users (non-excludability). These goods are also called pure collective goods. ((s) Example Networks).
Brocker I 487
VsOlson: some authors note that collective goods may have far more properties than those used by Olson and that these properties may also be relevant to the question of the realisation of these goods in groups (3). Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1970) (4), for example, analyse collective goods that are only made possible with a large number of collective users. In addition, there are goods that are not continuously variable, but require a minimum level of participation in order to be made available at all (Chong 1991)(5).
1. Musgrave, Richard A., »Public Finance and Finanzwissenschaft Traditions Compared«, in: FinanzArchiv/Public Finance Analysis 53/2, 1996, 145-193.
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert (suhrkamp taschenbuch wissenschaft) (German Edition) (Kindle Locations 9884-9886). Suhrkamp Verlag. Kindle Edition.
2. Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, Cambridge, Mass. 1965. Dt.: Mancur Olson, Die Logik des kollektiven Handelns: Kollektivgüter und die Theorie der Gruppen, Tübingen 1998 (zuerst 1968)., S. 36f.
3. Carolin Stange, Die Übertragbarkeit lokaler Lösungsansätze auf Bereitstellungsprobleme Globaler Öffentlicher Güter, Dissertation, Bamberg 2017, Kap. 2.
4. Frohlich, Norman/Oppenheimer Joe A., »I Get By With a Little Help from My Friends«, in: World Politics 23/1, 1970, 104-120.
5. Chong, Dennis, Collective Action and the Civil Rights Movement, Chicago/London 1991.
Johannes Marx, „Mancur Olson, Die Logik des kollektiven Handelns“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
The logic of collective action: Public goods and the theory of groups Cambridge 1965
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018