Lifeworld/Habermas: this is about the socio-cultural conditions of a rational lifestyle. Here we must examine the structures that enable individuals and groups to rationalize their actions.
Interpretational systems and world views that reflect the background knowledge of social groups play a role here.
I first introduce the concept of the lifeworld as a correlative to processes of understanding. Communicatively acting subjects always communicate in the horizon of a lifeworld. Their lifeworld is based on more or less diffuse, always unproblematic background beliefs. It saves the interpretation work of previous generations; it is the conservative counterbalance to the risk of disagreement that arises with every current communication process.
Myth/Myths/Habermas. In mythical worldviews as the background for the interpretation of a lifeworld in a social group, the burden of interpretation is taken away from the individual group members as well as the chance to achieve a critical agreement. Here, the linguistic view of the world is reified as a world order and cannot be seen through as a critisable system of interpretation.
Lifeworld/Method/HabermasVsHusserl/Habermas: If we give up the basic concepts of consciousness philosophy in which Husserl deals with the lifeworld problems (1), we can think of the lifeworld represented by a culturally handed down and linguistically organized inventory of interpretative patterns. Then the context of reference no longer has to be explained in the context of phenomenology and psychology of perception, but as a context of meaning.
Lifeworld/Habermas: since the communication participants cannot take an extramundane position towards it, it has a different status than the other world concepts (the social, the subjective and the objective world), in which speakers and listeners can optionally refer to something objective, normative or subjective. This is not possible in relation to the lifeworld. With their help, the participants cannot refer to something "inter-subjective" either.
They always move within the horizon of their lifeworld and cannot refer to "something in the lifeworld", such as facts, norms or experiences. The lifeworld is also the transcendental place where speakers and listeners can meet and reciprocally claim that their statements fit into the world (the objective, social or subjective world).
The phenomenologically described basic features of the constituted lifeworld can be explained without difficulty if "lifeworld" is introduced as a complementary term to "communicative action".
Background/Lifeworld/Habermas: the lifeworld should not be equated with the background consisting of cultural knowledge. Instead, it is the case that the solidarity of the groups and competences of socialized individuals integrated via values and norms flow into communicative action.
Lifeworld/Habermas: when we conceive of society as a lifeworld, we assume a) the autonomy of those acting, b) the independence of culture, c) the transparency of communication. These three fictions are built into the grammar of narratives and return in a culturally biased Verstehen. (See Fiction/Habermas).
Lifeworld/System/Habermas: I understand social evolution as a second-level process of differentiation: system and lifeworld differentiate, in that the complexity of one and the rationality of the other grows, not only in each case as a system and as lifeworld - but both also differentiate from each other at the same time. From a systemic point of view, these stages can be characterized by newly occurring systemic mechanisms. These are increasingly separating themselves from the social structures through which social integration takes place.
Lifeworld/control media/communication media/language/Habermas: the conversion from language to control media (money, power (influence, reputation)) means a decoupling of the interaction from lifeworld contexts (see Lifeworld/Habermas),
Media such as money and power begin with the empirically motivated ties; they code a purpose-rational handling of calculable amounts of value and enable a generalized strategic influence on the decisions of other interaction participants, bypassing linguistic consensus-building processes.
N.B.: thus, the lifeworld is no longer needed for the coordination of actions.
1.E.Husserl, Erfahrung und Urteil, Hamburg 1948; zur Kritik an den bewusstseinstheoretischen Grundlagen der phänomenologischen Sozialontologie von A. Schütz vgl. M. Theunissen, Der Andere, Berlin 1965, S. 406ff._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981