|Mause I 2767259
Social Goods/Tullock/Buchanan: Background problem: because of the unidentifiable number of free riders who do not pay anything for the benefit of the social good, its value cannot be determined. (See also VsSmauelson).
Solution/Tullock/Buchanan: the ability to approve should not be applied to individual expenditure items but to the constitutional level. Question: how to design decision rules at the political level in such a way that undesirable and unfavourable results are largely excluded. (1)
Buchanan: from this, a constitutional economics based on contract theory is developed. (2)
1. James M. Buchanan & Gordon Tullock. The calculus of consent. Logical foundations of constitutional democracy. Ann Arbor 1962.
2. James M. Buchanan. 1990. The domain of constitutional economics. Constitutional Political Economy 1 (1): 1– 18._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
James M. Buchanan
Politics as Public Choice Carmel, IN 2000
Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018