|Mause I 157
Social Goods/overfishing/Common/Vernon L Smith: Fishing: Problem: in the game of individual profit interests, the oceans are not only overexploited, they also serve as a free "garbage dump". (1)(2)(3). For an overview of formal models of fishery management: Kaitala, 1986 (4).
1. Gordon, H. Scott, The economic theory of a common-property resource: The fishery. Journal of Political Economy 62 (2), 1954, p. 124– 142.
2. Smith, Vernon L., On models of commercial fishing. Journal of Political Economy 77, (2), 1969, p.181– 198.
3. Munro, Gordon R, Approaches to the economics of the management of high seas fishery resources: A summary. Canadian Journal of Economics 29 (Special Issue: Part 1), 1996, p. 157– 164.
4. Kaitala, Veijo, Game theory models of fisheries management – A survey. In Dynamic games and applications in economics, Hrsg. Tamer Başar, Berlin 1986 p. 252– 266._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
The Theory of Moral Sentiments London 2010
Vernon L. Smith
Rationality in Economics: Constructivist and Ecological Forms Cambridge 2009
Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018