Cyberlaw/internet law/international law/Lessig: if you’re offering Nazi material, and a French citizen enters your site, you should block her, but if she is a U.S. citizen, you can serve her. Each state would thus be restricting the citizens of other states as those states wanted. But citizens from its nation would enjoy the freedoms that nation guarantees. This world would thus graft local rules onto life in cyberspace.
Each state […] has its own stake in controlling certain behaviors, and these behaviors differ. But the key is this: The same architecture that enables Minnesota to achieve its regulatory end can also help other states achieve their regulatory.
An ID-rich Internet ((s) a structure that does not permit much anonymity) would facilitate international zoning and enable this structure of international control. Such a regime would return geographical zoning to the Net. It would reimpose borders on a network built without those borders.[…] To those who love the liberty of the original Net, this regime is a nightmare. […] Of course, my view is that citizens of any democracy should have the freedom to choose what speech they consume. But I would prefer they earn that freedomby demanding it through democraticmeans than that a technological trick give it to them for free.[…] This regime gives each government the power to regulate its citizens; no government should have the right to do anything more.
Liberty depends on the regulation remaining expensive. […] There is both a surprisingly great desire for nations to embrace regimes that facilitate jurisdiction-specific regulation and a significant reason why the costs of regulation are likely to fall. We should expect, then, that there will be more such regulation. Soon. The effect, in short, would be to zone cyberspace based on the qualifications carried by individual users. It would enable a degree of control of cyberspace that few have ever imagined. Cyberspace would go from being an unregulable space to, depending on the depth of the certificates, the most regulable space imaginable.
The problems that cyberspace reveals are not problems with cyberspace. They are real-space problems that cyberspace shows us we must now resolve—or maybe reconsider.
Jean CampVsLessig: Jean Camp, a Harvard computer scientist who taught in the Kennedy School of Government, said that I had missed the point. The problem, she said, is not that “code is law” or that “code regulates.
LessigVsVs: Of course, for the computer scientist code is law. And if code is law, then
obviously the question we should ask is:Who are the lawmakers?
But to a lawyer, both Camp and I, throughout this book, have made a very basic mistake. Code is not law, any more than the design of an airplane is law. […] When we lawyers tell the Jean Camps of the world that they are simply making a “mistake” when they bring the values of public law to code, it is rather we who are making the mistake.Whether code should be tested with these constraints of public value is a question, not a conclusion. It needs to be decided by argument, not definition.
Does this mean that we should push for open rather than closed code? Does it mean that we should ban closed code? (See Code/Lessig).
The cost of “piracy” is significantly less than the cost of spam. Indeed, the total cost of spam—adding consumers to corporations—exceeds the total annual revenues of the recording industry. (1) So how does this difference in harm calibrate with what Congress has done to respond to each of these two problems?
1. David Blackburn, “On-line Piracy and RecordedMusic Sales” (Harvard University, Job
Market Paper, 2004._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Code: Version 2.0 New York 2006ff