Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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D. Kaplan on Character - Dictionary of Arguments
Newen I 120 Two-dimensional semantics/Kaplan/Newen/Schrenk: Differentiation of utterance context: in it an utterance is made and a truth condition (WB) is defined - and an evaluation world: in it the utterance is judged as true or false. Character/Kaplan: Table in which an utterance (in the case of Kaplan the indexical) is written and then, in rows, the utterance contexts are entered, and in columns, the evaluation worlds are entered. This also takes into account the context dependency of indicators. ((s) Example: "I am in NY (Rio/Tokyo)" expressed in NY/Rio/Tokyo. Definition Character: Function of possible utterance contexts on truth conditions. The sentence only gets its truth conditions in a situation of utterance. >Truth conditions, >Two-dimensional semantics. Newen I 121f Two-dimensional Semantics/Kaplan/Newen/Schrenk: differentiates necessary/a priori: necessary: e.g. "I am Cicero": in the first line only true. (If true, necessary true, otherwise necessary false.) - a priori: e.g. "I am here now" diagonal only true, otherwise false. Diagonal: indicates the fact that the place and time is always the place and time of utterance. Stalnaker: Suggestion: to only consider the diagonal. Necessary and a priori: e. g. Cicero is identical to Cicero: here only true everywhere. --- Stalnaker I 192 Definition Character/Kaplan: = Meaning - Function of possible (usage) contexts on speakers - (Newen/Schrenk: the character is the entire table of two-dimensional semantics). Kaplan thesis: Character and content must be separated - character/meaning: is a rule that says how the speaker is determined by facts about the context. >Content/Kaplan. Content/Kaplan: = secondary intension. Content: possibly unknown despite language competence. ((s) >Gods-example: Two omniscient Gods) - ((s) Character (s): Who it could be. Contents: Who it really is.) - For example, to whom "I" refers. --- Stalnaker I 194 Content/secondary Intension: can be different in different possible worlds a) Because the context is different b) Because the meaning is different. (This is part of the metasemantics). --- Stalnaker I 208 Character/Chaplan/Stalnaker: is determined by the primary intension. Cognitive value/Stalnaker: is then the character of a thought. >Intension, >Intension/Stalnaker._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
D. Kaplan Here only external sources; compare the information in the individual contributions. New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-19