Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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Barry Taylor on Facts - Dictionary of Arguments
II 263 Facts/F/tradition/Barry Taylor: description of sentences = existing situations - logical complexes - constituents: the entities that are relevant for the truth of any sentence - Problem: relevance when a totality of F is given. >Relevance. Def existing/Taylor : an element exists if its description is true. II 264 Theory of Tradition/Tradition: logical truths: all have the same descriptum - VsTradition: coextension: not the same F: E.g. having a heart, having kidneys. >Coextension. But synonymy: "aardvark/groundhog": here we have the same fact. >Synonymy. Tradition needs the principle of material adequacy: that is, the entities (constituents) must be relevant for the truth of the sentences that they describe. >Adequacy. II 269 Vs: this is vague and formulation-dependent. II 277 Negative facts/B. Taylor: conflict between principle of material equivalence and condition 3: intuitively, the same elements are relevant for the truth of the sentence S as for its negation. But S and ~ S have opposite truth conditions. >Truth conditions. That is, the sentences must have different descriptions. - Solution: take the negation sign itself as an element; above the elements which are themselves relevant for the truth of S. - Then neg F as category sui generis. >Negative fact. Negation: must have common constituents with the corresponding positive F. >Negation. II 277/8 Definition Fact/F/Barry Taylor: new: every F x in S associates with the set of "F-states (x)" of total states, so that x exists iff the actual total state is an element of the set of F-states (x). II 279 Then facts are equivalence classes on S (= sentence or set of F) under the relation ~, but whereby the descriptum of a sentence is now seen as an equivalence class to which belongs its descriptum in the former sense, and the new fact as existing, if their elements in the former sense exist. - Facts are then elements of S. II 280f Facts/application/B. Taylor: we no longer need that for truth conditions - and not anymore for a Tarskian truth theory - (the semantic apparatus is strong enough). >Truth conditions, >Truth theory, >A. Tarski, >Theory of truth//Tarski, >Definition of truth/Tarski. Facts: were used to explain connection between analytic/synthetic sentences - analytic sentences do not describe any F. Cf. >Truthmakers. New: method: to paraphrase sentences of natural language - e.g. Fischer's victory over Spasskij caused Breshnievs anger: victory (f,s) anger (b) - then expand syntax: by double-digit sentence operator "tries victory (f,s) anger (b)". Problem: fulfillment and truth for the extended language. - "Causes" is not truth-functional: solution: perhaps two-digit predicate of the meta-language "caus": should only be valid between existing facts - (and such that are equivalent to these - a sequence of elements satisfies caus(A,B) under the interpretation I iff caus(ascribe (A,s), ascribe(B,s)). >Satisfaction, >Truth functions, >Attribution, >Causation, >Truth._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
EconTayl I John Brian Taylor Discretion Versus Policy Rules in Practice 1993 Taylor III Lance Taylor Central Bankers, Inflation, and the Next Recession, in: Institute for New Economic Thinking (03/09/19), URL: http://www.ineteconomics.org/perspectives/blog/central-bankers-inflation-and-the-next-recession 9/3/2019 TaylorB II Barry Taylor "States of Affairs" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976 TaylorCh I Charles Taylor The Language Animal: The Full Shape of the Human Linguistic Capacity Cambridge 2016 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-16