Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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Rawls I 185
Ideal Observer/Society/Order/Justice/R. Firth/Rawls: Firth assumes that an ideal observer has different general interests, even if they are not specific; and that these interests are even necessary if such an observer is to display significant moral reactions at all. Firth, however, does not say anything substantive about these interests that would enable to explain how his preferences and dislikes come about. (See R. Firth, "Ethical Absolutism and the Ideal Observer", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 12,1952.)


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Firth I
Roderick Firth
Max Black
Ernest Nagel, et al.
Science, Language, and Human Rights: American Philosophical Association 2012

Rawl I
J. Rawls
A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2020-08-13
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