1. unlike moral requirements, obligations arise from voluntary action, whether explicitly or tacitly.
2. the content of an obligation is always defined by an institution.
3. obligations are usually due to an individual, namely those individuals whose cooperation maintains a questionable arrangement.
Examples are obligations resulting from a public office or marriage.
It may be that someone is entitled to refuse obligations if this follows from the principle of fairness.
Reciprocity: does not follow from a contractual agreement between individuals, but from the second part of the fairness principle: (See Rawls I 111: "This arrangement has been approved.")
I 116 (Note)
Commitments/M. Waltz/Rawls: Views to derive political obligations solely from consensus can be found in M. Walzer Obligations: Essays on Disobedience, War, and Citizenship, Cambridge, Mass. 1970, pp. Ix-xvi, 7-10,18-21, and ch. 5.
Duties/Commitment/Rawls: Question: under what conditions are we obliged to comply with an unfair law? It is a mistake that we would never be obliged to do this.
Up to certain limits, we are obliged to comply with unfair laws within the framework of our legal system. Problem: where are the limits? Different principles must be weighed here.
Additional problem: our principles of justice accept an ideal society in perfect order, including strict compliance with laws.
Inequality: when we are dealing with injustice, other principles come into play, including a theory of punishment, equitable justice, fair war, civil disobedience and military resistance. The theory of justice as fairness cannot be applied directly to it._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005