Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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Author Item Summary Meta data
Rawls I 254
Kant/SidgwickVsKant/Sidgwick/Rawls: Sidgwick writes that nothing in Kant's ethics is more striking than the idea that the human expresses his true self by acting according to moral law. On the other hand, when he/she gives in to certain needs, he/she acts according to the law of nature. (H. Sidgwick, "The Kantian Conception of Free Will", Mind, vol. 13,1888, pp. 511-516).
SidgwickVsKant/Rawls: according to Sidgwick, this idea collapses: it seems to him to be Kant's view that saints and villains have become what they are at their own free will (as a noumenal self) and at the same time are subject to the causal laws (as phenomenal self).
I 255
Kant now, after Sidgwick, fails to explain why the villain in his/her bad life does not express his/her being himself/herself as much as the saint does in his/her life.
KantVsSidgwick/KantVsVs/Rawls: Kant should reply that any consistent action according to principles could be the result of a decision of the noumenal self, but that not every action of the phenomenal self reveals this as a free and equal rational being.
RawlsVsKant: Kant did not show that our actions under moral law show our nature in a recognizable way, as acting according to contrary principles would not do.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Sidgwick I
Henry Sidgwick
Methods of Ethics 2017

Rawl I
J. Rawls
A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2019-08-19
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