Kant/Justice/Principles/Categorical Imperative/Rawls: My interpretation of Kant focuses on the concept of autonomy.
RawlsVsHare: We should not understand Kant primarily in terms of universality and generality. That would be too narrow a basis to construct a moral theory. (Cf. R. M. Hare, Freedom and Reason, Oxford, 1963, pp. 123f.)
Rawls: For a complete understanding of Kant's later writings, one has to consider Kant's later writings.
Moral/Kant/Rawls: Kant begins with the rational choice of moral principles and their rational assessment.
As legislation for an empire of ends, moral principles must not only be acceptable to everyone, but must also be publicly known. They must be accepted by free and equally rational individuals. (See Autonomy/Kant/Rawls).
Categorical imperative/Kant/Rawls: the veil of ignorance (in my theory) robs the persons in the initial situation of a society to be established of all information about their future position anyway, which at the same time guarantees that they decide as free and equally rational persons.
Rawls: this adds several things to Kant's concept: e. g. that the chosen principles are applied not only to individuals, but to society as a whole. Nevertheless, I think we'll stay close to Kant.
RawlsVsKant: Kant did not show that our actions under moral law show our nature in a recognizable way, as acting according to contrary principles would not do.
Solution/Rawls: our assumption of the initial situation with the veil of ignorance resolves this deficiency: we only have to show that our principles to be chosen are applicable. We accept the initial situation as one that is seen by the noumenal self in Kant's sense.
Qua noumenale they have the free choice between principles. At the same time, however, they want to express their rationality in the world around them, i. e. their independence from contingent characteristics of nature and society. If the argument from contract theory is correct (see Contract Theory/Rawls), precisely those principles define the moral law.
Our desire to behave justly then arises partly from the desire to express ourselves as free and equally rational beings. I think that is why Kant speaks of it as a reason for shame when we behave incorrectly and not as a reason for guilt.
Society/election/self/Kant/RawlsVsKant/Rawls: in two points I deviate particularly from Kant's conception ((s) as it is laid out in the categorical imperative):
1. the choice (of the principles) as noumenal self I assume to be the choice of a collective (self). This choice must be acceptable to other selfs.
2. I assume that the parties know that they are subject to the conditions of human life. In the light of these natural limitations, the principles are chosen. In Kant's case, it appears that he also includes the freedom of God or the freedom of pure intelligences, but these are not subject to the restrictions that demand that others be recognized as equally rational and free beings._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005