Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Immanuel Kant: Immanuel Kant (1724 - 1804) was a German philosopher. Kant is a representative of the German Idealism. His major works include Critique of Pure Reason (1781), Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics (1783), Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785), Critique of Practical Reason (1788), Critique of Judgment (1790). See also G.W.F. Hegel, Idealism._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Hilary Putnam on Kant - Dictionary of Arguments
VI 402ff Knowledge/I/Kant/Putnam: Kant's picture of knowledge understood this as a "representation", a kind of game. I am the author of this game. I: but the author of the game also appears in the game itself. "Empirical I"/Kant/Putnam: the author in the game is not the "real author", he/she is the "empirical I". Transcendental Ego/Kant/Putnam: the transcendental ego is the "real" author of the game. (outside the game). I/internal realism/PutnamVsKant: I would modify the author's picture in two respects: 1. The authors (in the plural, my picture is social) do not write one but several versions. 2. The authors in the stories are the real authors. PutnamVsSkepticism: N.B.: that would be "crazy" if these are only fictions. Because a fictional character cannot be a real author. But these are true stories. --- V 52 Determinism/Kant: determinism said that such a defense is component of rationality itself. We do not discover the principle of determinism, but we impose it on the world. >Determinism. PutnamVsKant: this goes too far. The price would be a too great complication of our knowledge system. V 88 Putnam: one could read Kant as if he had first obtained the position of the internalism. Of course, not explicitly. >Internalism/Putnam. V 89 I suggest to read it as if he said that Locke's thesis about the secondary qualities applies to all qualities: the simple, the primary and the secondary. >Qualities/Locke. V 90 If all properties are secondary: then everything what we say about an object has the form: it is such that it affects us in this or that way. Our ideas of objects are not copies of mind independent things. PutnamVsKant: today the concept of the noumenal world is considered an unnecessary metaphysical element in its thinking. >Noumenal world. V 118 Rationality/Putnam: rationality is not determined by unalterable rule directories, as Kant believed, described to our transcendental nature. PutnamVsKant: the whole idea of a transcendental nature (noumenal) is nonsense. >Rationality, >Transcendentals. --- Putnam I (c) 93 Reference/theory/Putnam: one can also say it very briefly: "electron" refers to electrons, how else should we say within a conceptual system with "electron" as a primitive term, whereupon "electron" refers to? This also solves to a certain extent the "dilemma of Quine" and Kant: "Quinean Dilemma"/Putnam: (also in Kant): there is a real world, but we can only describe it with our conceptual system. >Conceptual scheme, >Reference system. PutnamVsQuine/PutnamVsKant: so what? How else should we describe it otherwise? Should we use the term system of someone else? I (f) 169 Noumenon/noumenal world/PutnamVsKant: a noumenon is now regarded as an unnecessary metaphysical element. Properties/Kant/Putnam: N.B.: the subtle point is that Kant thinks that all this also applies to sensation ("objects of the inner sense") as well as to external objects. E.g. "E is like this here" (whereby you concentrate on E) means: "E is like E". Kant: in reality no judgment has come about. Putnam: this is merely an inarticulate sound, a noise. I (f) 169/170 Putnam: if "red" on the other hand is a real classification expression when I say that this sensation E belongs to the same class as sensations that I call "red" on other occasions, then my judgment goes beyond what is immediately given. Sensation/similarity/noumenon/PutnamVsKant: whether the sensations that I have at different times, (noumenal) are "really" all similar, this question makes no sense. Kant ignores this completely. The sensations that I call "red", cannot be compared directly with noumenal objects to see if they have the same noumenal property as the objects which I call "gold", neither can they be directly compared with noumenal objects to see if they have the same noumenal property. The objects are similar for me, they are red for me. That is my sensation. Properties/PutnamVsKant: if he says that all properties are secondary (that is, they are assets) then this would be the property of a noumenal object, to invoke in us the impression of pinewood, for example. I (f) 170/171 At this point, he is close to saying that he gives up the correspondence theory. Def Truth/Kant: truth is "the agreement of knowledge with its object". PeirceVsKant: this is a nominal definition of truth. Assets/Kant: assets are attributed to the whole noumenal world._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller, Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller, Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller, Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller, Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller, Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller, Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller, Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller, Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller, Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller, Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller, Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf, Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich, Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich, Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-18