Psychology Dictionary of Arguments

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Reason: Reason in philosophy is the ability to think clearly and logically about the world around us. It is the capacity to draw inferences from evidence, to identify and solve problems, and to make informed decisions. Reason is often contrasted with emotion, intuition, and faith. In Hegel there is a distinction between Verstand (that recognizes the differences) and Vernunft (that reassembles them). See also Hegel, Idealism, Thinking, Mind.
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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

Wilhelm Dilthey on Reason - Dictionary of Arguments

Gadamer I 223
Reason/Dilthey/Gadamer: [Dilthey intended] to supplement Kant's critique of pure reason with a critique of historical reason. This task alone shows the turning away from speculative idealism. It establishes an analogy that is to be understood quite literally. Dilthey wants to say: historical reason needs justification just as much as pure reason. The epoch-making result of the Critique of Pure Reason was not only that metaphysics as a pure science of reason was destroyed by the world, soul and God, but that at the same time a field was established within which the use of a priori concepts is justified and makes knowledge possible.
Gadamer: This critique of Pure Reason not only destroyed the dreams of a spirit-reader, it also answered the question of how pure natural science is possible. In the meantime, speculative idealism had taken the world of history into the self-explication of reason, and moreover, especially through Hegel, had achieved ingenious achievements in the historical field. With this, the claim of the pure science of reason has been in principle extended to the
Gadamer I 224
historical knowledge. It was part of the Encyclopedia of the Spirit. But in the eyes of the historical school, the speculative philosophy of history was as blatant dogmatism as rational metaphysics had been. Cf. >Kant/Gadamer
, >Epistemology/Gadamer.
Gadamer I 225
Hegel: By teaching reason in everything, even in history, Hegel had been the last and most universal representative of the ancient Logos philosophy.
Problem: Now, in view of the criticism of a priori philosophy of history, one saw oneself once again caught in the spell of Kantian criticism, whose problem now also arose for the historical world, after the claim of a pure construction of reason of world history was rejected and historical knowledge was also limited to experience. If history, as little as nature, is thought of as a manifestation of the spirit, then it is just as much a problem in what way the human spirit should recognize history as the knowledge of nature had become a problem for it through the constructions of the mathematical method.
Dilthey: So Dilthey had to look for an answer to the question of how pure natural science is possible, as well as Kant's answer to the question of how historical experience can become science. In a clear analogy to Kant's question, he therefore asked about the categories of the historical world that the humanities are capable of carrying. He does not forget, that experience here is something fundamentally different than in the field of knowledge of nature.
Neo-Kantianism: The categorical analysis [of the] "object of knowledge" was in the eyes of
of Neo-Kantianism the positive achievement of transcendental philosophy(1).
DiltheyVsNew Kantianism: [Dilthey] felt that New Kantian criticism itself was dogmatic, and he was just as right as when he called English empiricism dogmatic. For what supports the construction of the historical world are not facts taken from experience, which then come under a value reference; rather, their basis is the inner historicity that is suitable for experience itself. It is a life-historical process and has its model case not in the determination of facts, but
Gadamer I 226
in that peculiar fusion of memory and expectation into a whole which we call experience and which one acquires by having experiences. Thus it is in particular the suffering and the teaching which, through the painful experience of reality, is given to the person who matures through insight, which preformed the way of recognition for the historical sciences. They only think further, what is already thought in life experience.

1. Cf. H. Rickerts gleichnamiges Buch: Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis. Freiburg 1892.

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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Dilth I
W. Dilthey
Gesammelte Schriften, Bd.1, Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften Göttingen 1990

Gadamer I
Hans-Georg Gadamer
Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010

Gadamer II
H. G. Gadamer
The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986
German Edition:
Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977

Gadamer I
Hans-Georg Gadamer
Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010


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