|Consciousness, philosophy: The experience of differences along with a knowledge about alternatives as opposed to purely automatic responses. See also intentionality, identity theory, other minds._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
|Chalmers I 230
Consciousness/Rosenthal: (Rosenthal 1996): Thesis: For a state to be conscious, it must be the object of thought of a higher-level thought. These second level thoughts are usually not conscious, so we do not notice them.
ChalmersVs: considerations from the position of the third person speak against it, and second level thoughts do not seem to appear relevant to a cognitive system. They would usually be redundant (for example, if they were needed for every detail in the field of vision).
Experiences/Rosenthal: experiences are states of which we have a consciousness.
ChalmersVs: it is not certain that most of our experiences are the object of our thoughts._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
David M. Rosenthal
"Multiple drafts and the facts of matter"
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger, Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996
Constructing the World Oxford 2014