Psychology Dictionary of Arguments

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Consciousness, philosophy: consciousness ist the experience of differences along with a knowledge about alternatives as opposed to purely automatic responses. See also Intentionality, Identity theory, Other minds, Self-consciousness.
Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

David M. Rosenthal on Consciousness - Dictionary of Arguments

Chalmers I 230
Consciousness/Rosenthal: (Rosenthal 1996)(1): Thesis: For a state to be conscious, it must be the object of thought of a higher-level thought. These second level thoughts are usually not conscious, so we do not notice them.
ChalmersVs: considerations from the position of the third person speak against it, and second level thoughts do not seem to appear relevant to a cognitive system. They would usually be redundant (for example, if they were needed for every detail in the field of vision).
, >Cognition, >Thoughts.
Experiences/Rosenthal: experiences are states of which we have a consciousness.
ChalmersVs: it is not certain that most of our experiences are the object of our thoughts.
>Perception, >World/Thinking.

1. David M. Rosenthal (1996). "A theory of consciousness". In: Ned Block, Owen J. Flanagan & Güven Güzeldere (eds.), The Nature of Consciousness. MIT Press (1997).

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Rosenthal I
David M. Rosenthal
"Multiple drafts and the facts of matter"
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger, Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996

Cha I
D. Chalmers
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014

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