Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome | |||
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Interactionism: Interactionism in psychology is a perspective that views human behavior as the product of social interaction. Interactionists argue that people actively interpret and respond to their environment in ways that are shaped by their social experiences. See also Behavior, Socialisation, Actions, Situations._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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David Chalmers on Interactionism - Dictionary of Arguments
I 156 Dualism/Definition Interactionist Dualism/Definition Interactionism/Chalmers: here, experience fills the causal gaps in the physical process. ChalmersVs: that creates more problems than it solves. It does not solve the problems with epiphenomenalism. >Dualism, cf. >Property dualism, >Epiphenomenalism. Pro: the only argument for interactionist dualism are some properties of quantum mechanics that could be better explained. (> Eccles 1986)(1) I 157 ChalmersVsEccles: the effects would be much too small to effect any eventual behavioral changes. Other counter arguments: VsInteractionist dualism/Interactionism/Chalmers: 1. it contradicts the quantum mechanical postulate that the microscopic "decisions" are random. >Quantum mechanics. 2. a behavior that was triggered by these microscopic influences would have to differ from behavior triggered differently. ChalmersVsEccles: such theories are also silent on what should happen in the brain when the wave function collapses. >Wave function. ChalmersVsInteractionist dualism: this makes the phenomenal irrelevant: I 158 ChalmersVsEccles: if there are his psychons, then they can do without purely causal interactions, without assumed phenomenal properties. >Phenomena, >Experience. VsChalmers: one might object that psychons (or ectoplasm, or whatever) are constituted by phenomenal properties. ChalmersVsVs: even then their phenomenal properties are irrelevant to the explanation of the behavior: in the history of causation, it is only the relational properties that count. Thus it adheres to the causal unity of the physical. ChalmersVsInteractionism/ChalmersVsEccles: Even if one were to assume psychons, one could tell a story about zombies, which involved psychons. One would then again have to assume additional phenomenal properties of psychons without being able to prove them. >Zombies. I 162 Definition Interactionist Dualism/Chalmers: Chalmers accepts that consciousness is not physical (VsMaterialism) but he denies that the physical world is causally closed so that consciousness can play an autonomous causal role. >Causal closure, >Consciousness/Chalmers, cf. >Materialism. 1. Eccles, J.C. (1986) Do Mental Events Cause Neural Events Analogously to the Probability Fields of Quantum Mechanics? Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological Sciences, 227, 411-428. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.1986.0031_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |