Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Modalities: modalities are in modal logic possibility, necessity and contingency._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Paul Lorenzen on Modalities - Dictionary of Arguments
Wessel I 347 Modality/Wessel: modality is not a kind of truth value, as often is falsely assumed! Truth/Carnap: identifies truth and logical necessity, Truth value/Lukasiewicz: has a third truth value "possible" >Truth values. Lorenzen: uses "possible" and "possibly true" synonymously. WesselVsLorenzen. Truth value/Wessel: a truth value is a special logical predicate to which statements are pronounced or denied. The difference between modalities and truth values is obvious: since alethic modalities are only linked to subjects of the form sA (the fact that A) and truth values are linked only to such with those of the form tA (the statement A) to connect statements. Truth value: is a statement. Modality: is a fact. >Statements, >Facts, >States of affairs, >Levels/order._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Lorn I P. Lorenzen Constructive Philosophy Cambridge 1987 Wessel I H. Wessel Logik Berlin 1999 |
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> Counter arguments against Lorenzen
> Counter arguments in relation to Modalities
