Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Reductionism, philosophy: reductionism is a collective term for attempts, to either trace back statements in a subject area to statements from a sub-area of this subject area or equating statements of a subject area with statements of another subject area. The main point here is the justification of such transfers. Reductionism in the narrower sense is the thesis that reduction is possible. Typical reductionisms exist in the domain of the philosophy of mind. See also holism, eliminativism, materialism, physicalism, functionalism._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Patricia Churchland on Reductionism - Dictionary of Arguments
II 464 Reductionism/Churchland: Thesis: I am a reductionist. This does not mean that a pure bottom up strategy should be pursued. I also do not mean that descriptions of higher levels would be dubious in themselves. There are clearly higher-level properties, and so there is a need for corresponding descriptions. >Levels/order, >Description levels Definition Bottom up/Churchland: is the opinion according to which one must first know everything about the molecular basis before the psychological processes can be achieved. But this is not a reductionism either. II 468 VsReductionism/other authors: A) The goal is absurd. Stereotype critique: "I cannot imagine that pain should consist of any activity patterns of neurons" ChurchlandVsVs: that is nothing more than the impotence of the imagination. II 470 Vs Reductionism: if a macro-phenomenon can be the result of more than one mechanism (organization and dynamics of the components), then it cannot be identified with one of these mechanisms. The reduction of the macro-phenomenons on a single micro-phenomenon is then not possible. (>"Multiple realizability"). ChurchlandVsVs. II 471 Reductionism/Churchland: when the mechanism of a biological process has been discovered, it may be possible to invent devices that mimic these processes. The reductive success is not denied. Just as little, perhaps, that there might be DNAs in other parts of the universe. Reductionism/Churchland: It is not easy to argue VsReductionism and not to fall into dualism. (VsSearle). >Dualism, >Monism, >Property dualism._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Churla I Paul M. Churchland Matter and Consciousness Cambridge 2013 Churli I Patricia S. Churchland Touching a Nerve: Our Brains, Our Brains New York 2014 Churli II Patricia S. Churchland "Can Neurobiology Teach Us Anything about Consciousness?" in: The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates ed. Block, Flanagan, Güzeldere pp. 127-140 In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger, Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 |
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> Counter arguments against Churchland
> Counter arguments in relation to Reductionism
