Psychology Dictionary of Arguments

Home Screenshot Tabelle Begriffe

Propositional attitudes, philosophy: A propositional attitude is the attitude of a person in relation to an object, often expressed in the form of a that-clause. Paul, for example, believes that Elmer believes the same as himself. For propositional attitudes, special identity conditions apply because one has to take into account what is known to the person and what language use they have. See also propositions, identity conditions, opacity.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

Steven E. Boer on Propositional Attitudes - Dictionary of Arguments

Propositional attitudes/individuation/Lewis: (1969)(1): the mere existence of a convention of this kind presupposes that speakers from a community have certain propositional attitudes with certain conditions of fulfillment.
> Intensional Objects
Propositional attitudes/belief/Boer: the whole is plausible, but not substantial enough to answer philosophical questions.
E.g. why are beliefs not complete under logical equivalence, and even if it is under entailment?
What does it mean that two people have the same belief? (And not just a similar one).
For example, how can rational people believe things that are not true? (Error, deception).
For example, if water is necessarily H20, why does this not automatically provide the scientific knowledge?
Solution: for such questions we need a substantial theory and ontology of beliefs qua propositional attitudes. That's what this book is all about.

1. David Lewis 1969. Convention: A Philosophical Study, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Boer I
Steven E. Boer
Thought-Contents: On the Ontology of Belief and the Semantics of Belief Attribution (Philosophical Studies Series) New York 2010

Boer II
Steven E. Boer
Knowing Who Cambridge 1986

Send Link
> Counter arguments against Boer

Authors A   B   C   D   E   F   G   H   I   J   K   L   M   N   O   P   Q   R   S   T   U   V   W   Z  

Concepts A   B   C   D   E   F   G   H   I   J   K   L   M   N   O   P   Q   R   S   T   U   V   W   Y   Z