Psychology Dictionary of Arguments

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Intentionality: intentionality is the ability of people and higher animals to relate to and react to circumstances such as things and states. Concepts, words, and sentences also refer to something but have no intentionality. This linguistic relating-to is called reference instead.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

Steven E. Boer on Intentionality - Dictionary of Arguments

I 4
Definition semantic intentionality/Boer: weaker: can be defined by fulfillment conditions with quasi-semantic characteristics.
Fulfillment conditions/EB: are determined asymmetrically by thought contents (GI).
N.B.: therefore, all cognitive intentional states are semantically intentional, but not vice versa. E.g. to have a thought content is to have certain terms, but not vice versa.
Animal/Thinking/Terms/Boer/(s): Thesis: we could concede animals certain terms, but not the full handling with them. And indeed, rather, in attributed whole sentences, not alone.
Perception/Semantics/Cognition/Peacocke/Boer: Thesis: some perceptual states are semantic but not cognitively intentional.
Boer: that is controversial. ((s) Whether perception can also be non-conceptual).
I 6
Definition weak metaphysical intentionality/Boer: the fact that a relation is participation-independent, or a condition that is such that its existence entails a participation-independent relation to something.
Intentionality/Boer: some authors have something stronger in mind:
I 7
Existence-independence/conceptual dependency/intentionality/Smith/McIntyre/Boer: (Smith, McIntyre, 1982)(1):
BoerVs: Problem: this is much more remote from actualism.
I 10
Definition metaphysical strongly intentional/Boer: is a relation R iff it is both existence-independent in the sense of (D3sub) and is concept dependent in the sense of (D4sub).
Sufficient condition for this:

(4) (ER) {that a subject is a in s entails (Σw) aRw & M [Σx) (Σy) x exists and xRy, but y does not exist and M (Σx) (Σy) (Σz) (y = z & xRy & ~ xRz)]}.

(D4sub) R is a concept dependent relation = it is possible that (Σx) (Σy (Σz) (y = z & x has R to y &~(x has R to z)).

For example, Oedipus wants to marry Iokaste, but not his mother.

E.g. to believe that... exists (But ... does not exist)
I 11
Boer: Thesis: this can be a real relation. (In substitutional quantification/sQ).
I 20
Definition strong metaphysical intentionality/Boer: is a relation between terms by virtue of their simultaneous existence-independence in the sense of (D3NA) and conceptual dependency. In the sense of (D5).
Definition strongly metaphysical intentional state/Boer: exists when in this state being is involved, since one stands in at least one strongly metaphysical intentional relation to a being.

1. Smith, D. W. & McIntyre, R. (1982) Husserl and Intentionality. Dordrecht: Reidel Publishing Co.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Boer I
Steven E. Boer
Thought-Contents: On the Ontology of Belief and the Semantics of Belief Attribution (Philosophical Studies Series) New York 2010

Boer II
Steven E. Boer
Knowing Who Cambridge 1986

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