## Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome | |||

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Dependence: this is about the question whether statements, phenomena, beliefs, attitudes, and actions are influenced causally or otherwise by other statements, beliefs, events, actions etc. and whether this influence is indispensable for their realization. See also counterfactuals, absoluteness._____________ Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||

Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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Steven E. Boer on Dependence - Dictionary of Arguments I 7 Conceptual dependency/conceptual/strong metaphysical intentionality/Boer: is the second feature of strong intentionality: is much more problematic: For example, Oedipus would like to marry Iokaste. marry. Must then be conceptually dependent, because he certainly does not want to marry his mother. --- I 8 Conceptual dependency/Boer: it seems that we should characterize it by (CD): (CD) R is a concept-dependent relation = it is possible that for some objects x and y and properties F and G, x R to y, qua has the thing that is F, but x has R not to y qua the thing which is G. Vs: this makes conceptual dependency easily to something paradox. It can happen that the identity of terms is no longer respected: E.g. objects a, b and x, so that b = c and a has R to b, but a does not have R to c. This would follow logically from (CD), if the definiens of (CD) was merely symbolized as M (Ex) (Ey) (EF) (EG) (y = the F & y = the G & R (x, the F) & R (x, the G)). That would be fatal. Relation/Boer: the mere idea of a relation, which does not recognize the identity of its terms, violates the following two principles (in referential quantification): (P2) For objects x and y: if x = y, then for every property F applies, x has F iff Y has F. (Leibniz's law) (P3) Neccessary, for each double-digit relation R and objects x and y: x has R to y iff y has the relational property of being a thing z such that x has R to z (formal: "[λzRxz]"). This is the principle of abstraction/concretion. Both principles are indisputable and have (T2) as a consequence: (T2) For arbitrary objects x, y, z and every two-digit relation R: if y = z and x has R to y, then x has R to z. For according to (P3) there is then a property [λzRxz] which is exemplified by y. And because of y = z, z must have it itself, then it follows from (T2) that x has R to z. This derivation of T2) is not circular, because from the formula φ --- I 9 and equation [a = b] we derive with standard substitution for identity: Φ (a//b). Substitutability/Identity/Conceptual dependency/Boer: those who think that conceptually dependent relations do not respect the identity of their terms, would not the recognize substitutability. _____________ Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Boer I Steven E. Boer Thought-Contents: On the Ontology of Belief and the Semantics of Belief Attribution (Philosophical Studies Series) New York 2010 Boer II Steven E. Boer Knowing Who Cambridge 1986 |

> Counter arguments against **Boer**

> Counter arguments in relation to **Dependence**