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Psychology Dictionary of Arguments

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Imagination, philosophy: imaginations are mental representations of non-present situations, events, states, sensory perceptions, experiences with certain characteristics, tones, sound sequences, sounds, noises, voices, smells, heat, coldness etc. The imagination of something undefined is not possible. Understanding a sentence can create an idea of the corresponding situation or image. See also representations past, future, mental states.
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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

Bernard Williams on Imagination - Dictionary of Arguments

Frank I 550
Imagination/Williams: (Williams 1973b)(1): E.g. "I am in the West Indies" - "someone is in the West Indies"
Evans: there is a difference whether we take an internal perspective or not - but it does not follow that there is such a gap in apparent memories.
>Localization
, >Consciousness, >Self-knowledge, >Knowledge.

1. Bernard Williams (1973). Problems of the Self. Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 37 (3):551-551

Gareth Evans(1982): Self-Identification, in: G.Evans The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell,
Oxford/NewYork 1982, 204-266

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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

WilliamsB I
Bernard Williams
Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy London 2011

WilliamsM I
Michael Williams
Problems of Knowledge: A Critical Introduction to Epistemology Oxford 2001

WilliamsM II
Michael Williams
"Do We (Epistemologists) Need A Theory of Truth?", Philosophical Topics, 14 (1986) pp. 223-42
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich, Aldershot 1994

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994


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