Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Coherence: Coherence is a feature of a system of sentences. Coherence theory is not primarily concerned with objects in the world but with prior knowledge and its itegration._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Nicholas Rescher on Coherence Theory - Dictionary of Arguments
Taken from Skirbekk, Wahrheitstheorien, Frankfurt 1996 I 346 Coherence Theory/Rescher: if you do not know the meaning of an allegedly true proposition, you need other propositions. >Propositions. Intuitive methods: observation (>intuitionist theory). ((s) Observation kead to criteria pragmatism: the equating of "true" and "useful to believe" needs a distinction between definition and criterion. >Criteria. Coherence/Bradley: Coherence is not the meaning of truth, but its referee (sic). I 362 Coherence/Rescher: Coherence is not the meaning of truth. >Truth, >Truth definition, >Coherence. I 366 Blanshard: truth consists of coherence. - Then coherence is also the definition of truth. RescherVsBlanshard: the step from coherence to facts is not a necessary step - coherence is also perfectly possible in fiction. Facts, >Fictions. I 377 Problem: lots of independent propositions can be represented as coherent._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Resch I Nicholas Rescher The Criteriology of Truth; Fundamental Aspects of the Coherence Theory of Truth, in: The Coherence Theory of Truth, Oxford 1973 - dt. Auszug: Die Kriterien der Wahrheit In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk, Frankfurt/M. 1977 Resch II N. Rescher Kant and the Reach of Reason: Studies in Kant’ s Theory of Rational Systematization Cambridge 2010 |
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> Counter arguments against Rescher
> Counter arguments in relation to Coherence Theory
