Psychology Dictionary of Arguments

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Truth, philosophy: a property of sentences, not a property of utterances because utterances are events. See also truth conditions, truth definition, truth functions, truth predicate, truth table, truth theory, truth value, correspondence theory, coherence theory. The most diverse approaches claim to define or explain truth, or to assert their fundamental indefinability. A. Linguistic-oriented theories presuppose either a match of statements with extracts of the world or a consistency with other statements. See also truth theory, truth definition, theory of meaning, correspondence theory, coherence theory, facts, circumstances, paradoxes, semantics, deflationism, disquotationalism, criteria, evidence. B. Action-oriented truth theories take a future realization of states as the standard, which should be reconciled with an aspired ideal. See also reality, correctness, pragmatism, idealization, ideas. C. Truth-oriented theories of art attribute qualities to works of art under certain circumstances which reveal the future realization of ideal assumed social conditions. See also emphatic truth, fiction, art, works of art.
Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

George Edward Moore on Truth - Dictionary of Arguments

Horwich I 46
Truth/Moore: (early): Truth is identical with reality.
Truth/Fact/Generalization/Russell/Moore/R.Cartwright: Problem: if true proposition is identical with fact, then problem of generalization: - It is not excluded that the true proposition 2 + 2 = 4 is identical with the proposition that Scott wrote Waverley (because equivalence requires only equality of truth values).
, >Reality, >Information, >Knowledge, >Generalization, >Equivalence, cf. >Homophony.

Solution: a particular proposition must be given to identify it with a fact. - Generalization: not well-formed: because the ultimate occurrence of "p" is not in a quantifiable proposition: For any proposition p, if p is true, then p is identical to the fact that p.
I 51
Truth/Moore: (late): Truth is not a simple property: a false belief needs no object.
There are no propositions at all.
Russell: retained propositions for years.
Fact/Moore: pro, but not as objects of belief.
>Objects of belief, >Facts.
I 56
Truth/proposition/Moore/Russell/R.Cartwright: truth as an unanalyzable simple property: leads to problems with propositions.
Having abandoned propositions, they identified the bearers of truth with faith. then a kind of correspondence theory became inevitable.
Truth must depend on something outside of faith itself.
>Reality, >World, >World/thinking.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Moore, Margaret
Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994

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