Psychology Dictionary of Arguments

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Goals: Goals are desired outcomes that we strive to achieve. See also Imagination, Purposes, Actions, Behavior, Will, Intentionality, Intentions.
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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

Marvin Minsky on Goals - Dictionary of Arguments

I 78
Goals/Artificial Intelligence/Minsky: A goal-driven system does not seem to react directly to the stimuli or situations it encounters. Instead, it treats the things it finds as objects to exploit, avoid, or ignore, as though it were concerned with something else that doesn't yet exist.
>Intelligence
, >Superintelligence, >Artificial Intelligence, >Artificial Consciousness, >Strong Artificial Intelligence, >Artificial Neural Networks, >Artificial General Intelligence, >AI Research, cf. >ChatGPT.
Solution:
Difference-engine: A difference-engine must contain a description of a desired situation. It must have subagents that are aroused by various differences between the desired situation and the actual situation. Each subagent must act in a way that tends to diminish the difference that aroused it. (…) we'll see that this is actually simpler than it seems, because most agents are already concerned with differences.
I 79
Intentions: Do difference-engines really want [something]? It is futile to ask that kind of question because it seeks a distinction where none exists - except in some observer's mind. We can think of a ball as a perfectly passive object that merely reacts to external forces.
The notion of goal makes it easy to describe certain aspects of what people and machines can do; it offers us the opportunity to use simple descriptions in terms of active purposes instead of using unmanageably cumbersome descriptions of machinery.
The difference-engine scheme remains the most useful conception of goal, purpose, or intention yet discovered.
I 165
Goals/Artificial Intelligence/Minsky: Proto-specialists: [there could be protospecialists for hunger, thirst, defense etc…]. t would not usually be practical to make an animal that way. With all those separate specialists, we'd end up with a dozen different sets of heads and hands and feet. Not only would it cost too much to carry and feed all those organs; they'd also get in one another's way! Despite that inconvenience, there actually do exist some animals that work this way and thus can do many things at once. Genetically, the swarms of social ants and bees are really multibodied individuals whose different organs move around freely. But most animals economize by having all their proto-specialists share common sets of organs for their interactions with the outer world.
Another kind of economy comes from allowing the proto-specialists to share what they learn.
Whenever we try to solve problems of increasing complexity, whatever particular techniques we already know become correspondingly less adequate, and it becomes more important to be able to acquire new kinds of knowledge and skills. In the end, most of the mechanisms we need for any highly ambitious goal can be shared with most of our other goals.
I 166
Cross-exclusion/Minsky: if several urgent needs occur at once, there must be a way to select one of them. (…) cross-exclusion, (…) appears in many portions of the brain. In such a system, each member of a group of agents is wired to send inhibitory signals to all the other agents of that group. This makes them competitors. When any agent of such a group is aroused, its signals tend to inhibit the others. This leads to an avalanche effect — as each competitor grows weaker, its ability to inhibit its challengers also weakens. The result is that even if the initial difference between competitors is small, the most active agent will quickly lock out all the others.
>Actions/Minsky.

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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Minsky I
Marvin Minsky
The Society of Mind New York 1985

Minsky II
Marvin Minsky
Semantic Information Processing Cambridge, MA 2003


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