Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Phenomenalism: is the notion that it is the manner of experience of the objects, and not the objects in themselves to which we can refer. In this case, the existence of the corresponding objects is not assumed in principle for all sensory impressions. See also empiricism, perception, sensory perception, sensory impressions._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Ruth Millikan on Phenomenalism - Dictionary of Arguments
I 312 Phenomenalism/Millikan: Thesis: Using a concept in a judgment is equivalent to asserting that certain laws are valid in an experience that takes place. >Predication, >Observation/Millikan, >Judgment, >Experience._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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> Counter arguments against Millikan
> Counter arguments in relation to Phenomenalism
