|Ontology: is the set of material or immaterial objects, of which a theory assumes that it can make statements about them. According to classical logic, an existence assumption must be assumed. In other fields of knowledge, the question of whether relations really exist or are merely mental constructs, is not always regarded as decisive as long as one can work with them. Immaterial objects are e.g. linguistic structures in linguistics. See also existence, mathematical entities, theoretical entities, theoretical terms, reality, metaphysics, semantic web._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Ruth Millikan on Ontology - Dictionary of Arguments
Ontology/Millikan: we are interested in the general structure the world must have in order for subject-predicate sentences, negation, etc. to be mapped on it.
Realism/Millikan: correctly understood, realism does not demand that the world has to be "properly divided".
>Realism/Millikan, >Picture theory, >Observation, >World/Thinking.
Ontology/Millikan: there is not one "single correct description" (articulation) of the facts.
Solution: Thesis: Structures, sets of possible transformations instead of things with properties. Similar to the group theory of mathematics, with which many problems of a similar kind have been solved.
Substance/Properties/Millikan: Thesis: "Substance" and "properties" are categories that are cut off relative to each other and relative to the operation of the negation. They do not mutually exclude one another.
Properties/Millikan: properties are varied elements of facts, receptive to negation.
Substances/Millikan: substances are also variable, but relative to other transformations.
Ontology/Category/Millikan: to grasp that a thing falls into an ontological category does not mean to have an inner representation, but a richer concept.
Classification/Millikan: the classification function is to change a concept, not to represent the world.
Category/Millikan: On the other hand, many of our words expressing categories also map the world.
For example, knowing that a thing is a mineral makes it possible to ask specific questions.
Knowing that a thing falls under a category is not a representation, e.g. "Gold is a chemical element" is not an inner representation.
Identity/Ontology/Millikan: if I am right, the ontology of identity is such that we can discover objective sameness in the world, i.e. to know when we identify something correctly.
Thus we can leave the paradoxes of verificationism, phenomenalism and idealism behind us. ((s) paradoxes that arise from the assumption of only momentary existence or only mental existence or only momentary perception).
Realism/Millikan: Thus we arrive at a fully developed realism (not classical realism, see Realism/Millikan.)._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987
"Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005