Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Pain, philosophy of mind: the philosophical discussion deals with the peculiarities of the concept of pain in contrast to other concepts such as perceptions, sensations and stimuli. In particular, it is about the relationship between physical and mental realization of pain. See also mind body problem, physical/psychic, rigidity, possible worlds, possible world semantics, perception, introspection, private language, necessity, certainty._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Norman Malcolm on Pain - Dictionary of Arguments
Cavell I 37 Norman Malcolm: Thesis: Attempt to reject the idea of a private pain, according to which it is impossible for two people to have the same pain. >Internal objects, >Mental objects, >Identification, >Individuation, >Identity, >Equality. Malcolm: Let us first agree that "equal" here means equality of description, and not "equality of place", so we see that it is very possible to share the same pain. CavellVsMalcolm: the argument is questionable, the skeptic can rightly assume here that our knowledge of the other is not enough. Knowledge is more than the presence of criteria. >Criteria, >Knowledge, >Self-knowledge. Cavell I 45 Pain/Numerical Identity/Qualitative Identity/Malcolm: Malcolm disputes the fact that one can reasonably say in (descriptive) identical painful occurrences that it is two. Thesis: with regard to sensory impressions, the concept of "numerical identity" has no application. >Sensations, >Sensory impressions, >Perception. Malcolm: if the description is the same, there cannot be the additional question whether the idea would also be the same! >Description, >Imagination. Example Cavell: one can say our "twin cars" do not differ, yet there are two. Why not in pain then? Because "equals" here means "descriptively equal"? Obviously not! >Distinctions, >Indistinguishability. Cavell I 46 Why should the skeptics not have the feeling that here it is presupposed what is still to be examined? >Skepticism. For example, for cars, the question is answered: there are two, in the case of colors the question is also answered: it is one! But in pain? Pain/Malcolm: Danger to think it is here as in the colors, styles, opinions or sudden ideas. It is a truism that there can be the same shades of color at the same time in many places. >Colour. Pain/CavellVsMalcolm: this seems to show that colors are different from headaches. But I can answer the question whether the pain is numerically identical with its: namely, they are not identical!_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Malcolm I Norman Malcolm "Thoughtless Brutes" in: The Nature of Mind, D. M. Rosenthal (Ed), Oxford 1991, pp. 445-461 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005 Malcolm II N. Malcom Problems of Mind: Descartes to Wittgenstein (Harper Essays in Philosophy) 1971 Cavell I St. Cavell Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen Frankfurt 2002 Cavell I (a) Stanley Cavell "Knowing and Acknowledging" in: St. Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say?, Cambridge 1976, pp. 238-266 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell, Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (b) Stanley Cavell "Excursus on Wittgenstein’s Vision of Language", in: St. Cavell, The Claim of Reason, Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy, New York 1979, pp. 168-190 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell, Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (c) Stanley Cavell "The Argument of the Ordinary, Scenes of Instruction in Wittgenstein and in Kripke", in: St. Cavell, Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome: The Constitution of Emersonian Perfectionism, Chicago 1990, pp. 64-100 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Davide Sparti/Espen Hammer (eds.), Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell II Stanley Cavell "Must we mean what we say?" in: Inquiry 1 (1958) In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
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