Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Observation: observation is detecting characteristics and behavior of objects by whatsoever contact with the object unlike conclusions from past processes or assumeded or imperceptible parts or hidden parameters. See also Hidden variable, Observation language, Theories, Theoretical entities._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Imre Lakatos on Observation - Dictionary of Arguments
Hacking I 286 Observation/LakatosVsPopper: Falsificationism cannot be correct, because it presupposes the distinction between theory and observation. The simple rule, according to which the human thinks and directs nature, is not tenable. Two wrong assumptions: 1. There is a psychological boundary between speculative and observation-related sentences. 2. The assumption that observation statements could be proved by facts. HackingVsLakatos: these assumptions have now been mocked for 15 years, but Lakatos' argumentation is superficial. Lakatos has only one example: Galileo's observation of solar spots through a telescope: Seeing/Lakatos: That could not have been pure seeing. >Method, cf. >Instrumentalism. >Observation sentence, >Observation, >Observation language, >Verification, >Falsification._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Laka I I. Lakatos The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes: Volume 1: Philosophical Papers (Philosophical Papers (Cambridge)) Cambridge 1980 Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
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> Counter arguments against Lakatos
> Counter arguments in relation to Observation
