Psychology Dictionary of Arguments

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Necessity, philosophy: different kinds of necessity are distinguished, differing in their strength. For example, physical, logical or metaphysical necessity. See also necessity de dicto, necessity de re.
Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

Frank Jackson on Necessity - Dictionary of Arguments

Schwarz I 226
Necessity a posteriori/Jackson/Schwarz: follow a priori from contingent truths about the current situation. (Lewis 1994b(1),296f,2002b(2), Jackson 1998a(3): 56 86).
Stalnaker I 18
Necessity a posteriori/Jackson: necessity a posteriori is a result of relatively superficial linguistic facts. It comes from an optional descriptive semantics which randomly characterizes natural languages: a mechanism to determine speakers.
Thesis: there could also be languages without a fixed reference, which even tells to a certain extent how things are, namely without necessary truths a posteriori.
>Necessity a posteriori
, >Reference, cf. >Reference semantics.
StalnakerVsJackson: however, if the reference-defining mechanisms are part of the meta-semantic history, they are not optional. They are part of the representation of what makes the fact that our utterances and internal states can have any representative properties at all. Necessary a posteriori truths are a feature of our intentionality.
Two-dimensional semantics/Stalnaker: two-dimensional semantics can show how the possible and the truth interact, i.e. to separate semantic from factual questions in the context.
>Two-dimensional semantics.
I 19
But it does not provide a context-free canonical language, in which we can give a neutral representation of the possibility space.

1. David Lewis [1994b]: “Reduction of Mind”. In Samuel Guttenplan (Hg.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Blackwell, 412–431
2. David Lewis [2002b]: “Tharp’s Third Theorem”. Analysis, 62: 95–97
3. Frank Jackson [1998a]: From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Jackson I
Frank C. Jackson
From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000

Schw I
W. Schwarz
David Lewis Bielefeld 2005

Stalnaker I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003

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